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ABSTRACT
An evolutionary change is taking place within the government with the ultimate
goal being a shift in ship design responsibility from "in-house" to "industry." Eventually,
it is predicted that the government would take on an advisory role as overseer and
reviewer of the design, much the way a customer acts in a commercial endeavor. This
evolution will not happen overnight, nor will it happen within one program. However,
efforts towards achieving this end can be seen in several recent Navy programs, to
varying degrees. These programs include the Icebreaker, Sealift, and LPD-17 programs.
Further efforts are currently being made in the DD-21 program.
The DDG-5 1, Icebreaker, Sealift, and LPD-17 programs will be presented in this
thesis. Each of these programs will serve as a unique case study in Navy ship acquisition.
The focus of these investigations will be the timeframe leading up to contract award at
Milestone II when approximately 80% of the final design is set. Of particular interest
will be the distribution of costs between government and industry for varying stages in
each program, the timing of these phases, as well as the point at which control of the
design has passed out of the government's hands and into the hands of industry.
This analysis will provide insight into predicting the design cost of the
government's efforts to get to Milestone II in future acquisition programs as the role of
the Navy continues to change. Examination of key government personnel on hand as
each program develops will prove useful in developing a generic team of core
professionals for future Navy programs as the government steps away from the design
front and focuses on its role of design review.
Thesis Supervisor: Henry S. Marcus
Professor of Marine Systems
NAVSEA Professor of Ship Acquisition
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1 INTRODUCTION
In 1990, the Chief Engineer of NAVSEA undertook a major self-examination of
the warship design, acquisition, and construction (DAC) process. He found that the time
required to design and construct warships had been steadily increasing over the past
twenty years. Several reasons for this were offered. Among them were the increased
complexity of ships and their systems, the wider range of alternatives studied, longer
decision-making process, and shrinking industrial base. As Tibbits and Keane put it,
"revolutionary changes in the DAC process were needed to achieve dramatic reductions
in total cycle time, and these process changes needed to start with design" (Reference 1).
The United States Navy acquisition process has entered a new arena with the
passing of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA). With this act,
emphasis is placed on the increased use of commercial "off-the-shelf' (COTS) products
and processes when possible. In addition, an evolutionary change is taking place within
the government with the ultimate goal being a shift in design responsibility from "in-
house" to "industry." Eventually, it is predicted that the government would take on an
advisory role as overseer and reviewer of the design, much the way a customer acts in a
commercial endeavor. The DoD imperative was to reduce the cost of new systems by
going to industry for their design and development (Reference 1). This evolution will not
happen overnight, nor will it happen within one program. However, efforts towards
achieving this end can be seen in several recent Navy programs, to varying degrees.
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These programs include the Icebreaker, Sealift, and LPD-17 programs. Further efforts
are currently being made in the DD-21 program.
The DDG-51, Icebreaker, Sealift, and LPD-17 programs will be presented in the
following sections. Each of these programs will serve as a unique case study in Navy
acquisition. The focus of these investigations will be the timeframe leading up to
contract award at Milestone II when approximately 80% of the final design is set. Of
particular interest will be the distribution of costs between government and industry for
varying stages in each program, the timing of these phases, as well as the point at which
control of the design has passed out of the government's hands and into the hands of
industry.
This analysis will provide insight into predicting the design cost of the
government's efforts to get to Milestone II in future acquisition programs as the role of
the Navy continues to change. Examination of key government personnel on hand as
each program develops will prove useful in developing a generic team of core
professionals for future Navy programs as the government steps away from the design
front and focuses on its role of design review.
14
2 ACQUISITION REFORM
The Navy is making strides in the acquisition community towards acquisition
reform. They have laid out a "new way of doing business" in the DoD 5000 revision.
The intent of the new instruction is to streamline the acquisition process by eliminating
unnecessary regulation, delegate authority to the lowest possible organization level,
eliminate non-essential military specifications and standards where commercial
specifications will suffice, and encourage maximum use of Commercial-off-the-Shelf
(COTS) equipment. High on the list of reform priorities is the management of programs
with a focus on reduced total life cycle costs. This includes designing platform systems
with an open-system architecture that will allow for follow-on technology insertion.
Several systems developed in this manner, such as the AN/SQS-53A EC-16 sonar and the
Air Combat Electronics Program (ARC 210), have resulted in reduced life cycle costs
and program manager man-hours, as well as in reduced system weight requirements.
The Navy also established an Acquisition Reform Office in January 1995 to show
their c.ontinued commitment to achieving improvements in acquisition reform. This
office is responsible for driving the acquisition reform agenda, including the development
of the Acquisition Center of Excellence. This center contains a virtual library open to all
Program Executive officers and Program Managers for use in developing acquisition
strategies, obtaining up-to-date acquisition information, reviewing lessons learned, and
testing acquisition ideas to support enhanced productivity and reduced costs.
15
2.1 THE PROCESS
The following section briefly describes the current, generic-ship acquisition
process. Figure 2.1 illustrates the four major milestone decision points and four phases of
the acquisition process. These typically provide a basis for comprehensive management
and the progressive decision-making associated with program maturation. Much of the
information here has been obtained from the 1998 MIT thesis, Right Sizing for
Government Review by A. Speirs as well as the Defense Acquisition Deskbook
(References 2,3). This section is provided to help the reader grasp the basic timeframe
and level of effort for various stages in the ship program leading up to the award of
contract. A clear understanding of the concepts presented here, as well as in Figure 2.1,
is necessary to interpret the examinations undertaken in this thesis.
2.1.1 Pre-Milestone 0
As Figure 2.1 shows, the acquisition process begins with the Determination of
Mission Need (DMS). This is the process by which DoD personnel determine
deficiencies in the Navy's planned capabilities. These deficiencies could take the form of
an aging fleet in need of replacement or in the lack of technology to counter a new threat.
Funding is allocated toward efforts that seek a solution to these specific military
problems. Funding is allocated based on the type of ship to be acquired, the previous cost
of a similar type of ship, and the available Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN)
money in that fiscal year. Mission characteristics and weaponry requirements are also
considered. These steps lead up to the issuance of a Mission Needs Statement (MNS)
16
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for a new vessel, as well as a threat assessment and Acquisition Strategy Report (ASR),
which signifies Milestone 0 approval.
2.1.2 Milestone 0
A milestone can be considered the point at which a recommendation is made and
approval is sought regarding further action within the acquisition process. Milestone 0:
Concept Direction marks the initial formal interface between the requirements generation
and the acquisition management systems. At this point, the Milestone Decision Authority
(MDA) may choose to approve further action be taken to study alternative concepts. Or,
the MDA may decide to cancel all further efforts at this time. Figure 2.2 illustrates the
type of assessments made at each milestone regarding the status of the program execution
and next-phase planning. The program is evaluated based on the risk levels regarding
cost, schedule, and performance. Exit criteria, as shown in the figure, pertain to program-
specific results that are required in the next phase. These criteria are established and
approved during the milestone review, before the next phase begins. Major points of
consideration by the MDA at Milestone 0 include:
* Validation of the MNS
e Satisfaction of need with non-material solution
* Allocation of funds to support study efforts, given this need is of sufficient
importance.
Assuming that the MDA grants further investigation into the MNS with the
issuance of the Milestone 0 Approval Decision Memorandum (ADM), efforts are carried
out either by in-house staff, contractors, or a combination of the two. In general, the
18















ADM documents the decisions made as a result of the milestone review and includes the
following:
e Definition of minimum set of alternatives to be examined
" Identification of funding source(s)
" Determination of exit criteria.
In addition, a Ship Acquisition Program Manager (SHAPM) is established. As Figure 2.1
showed, issuance of the ADM approves the start of Phase 0.
2.1.3 Phase 0
Phase 0 is referred to as Concept Exploration and Definition. This is a directed,
funded effort designed to provide a new, or improved, material capability in response to a
validated need. During this time, the acquisition strategy is developed, system
alternatives are proposed and examined, and the systems program requirements document
is expanded to support subsequent phases.
The acquisition strategy is a framework for planning, directing, and managing the
program to ensure objectives are met while operating within the imposed resource
constraints. Strategies regarding testing and evaluation, acquisition, competition, and
prototyping are often included. Government, industry, or a teaming of the two
undertakes competitive, parallel, short-term feasibility studies to determine the
advantages and disadvantages of proposed concepts. These studies investigate the
Reliability, Operationability, and Maintainability (ROM) of each concept and include a
first estimate on life-cycle costs. These combined efforts are known collectively as the
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) or as the Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis
(COEA.)
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Tasks carried out during Phase 0 include the following:
* Creation of validated assessment of military threat
* Consideration of technology and technical risk
* Assessment of merits of each alternative
* Identification of an acquisition strategy
* Identification of cost, schedule, and performance for approval
* Identification of potential environmental consequences
* Identification of program-specific accomplishments to be completed during
next phase
* Analysis of major technology and industrial capability issues
* Identification of cooperative opportunities
* Compliance with international arms control agreements
* Creation of proposed oversight and review strategy to include description of
milestone decision
* Development of system requirements concerning measures of effectiveness
(MoE).
These studies provide the basis for assessing relative merits of alternative concepts at
Milestone I, New Acquisition Program approval. The conclusion of these studies, which
require 3 to 18 months of effort, prompts the issuance of Milestone I review.
2.1.4 Milestone I
At Milestone I: New Acquisition Program approval, the MDA assesses the
affordability of the proposed new acquisition program. Interaction between planning,
programming, budgeting, and acquisition management systems takes place for the first
time. At Milestone I, MDA considers the following:
* Threat assessment
e Acquisition strategy
* Phase 0 exit criteria status and Phase I exit criteria plans
* Acquisition Program Baseline (APB)
* AoA and studies supporting needs of new program
* Environmental consequences
e Adequacy of resources (manpower and funding)
* Hierarchy of material alternatives
21
e Affordability assessment
A favorable decision at Milestone I authorizes the beginning of Phase I, Demonstration
and Validation, during which time the preliminary and contract designs are carried out.
2.1.5 Phase I
Preliminary and contract designs are carried out during Phase I of the acquisition
program. Modern day ship design and acquisition processes do not separate preliminary
design from contract design. These are seamless design activities and are both conducted
between MS I and II. An Operational Requirements Document (ORD) is issued which
documents the user's objectives and minimum acceptable requirements for operational
performance of a proposed concept. DoD 5000 has standardized the format for this
document. This phase, commonly referred to as Concept Demonstration and Validation,
consists of steps necessary to resolve or minimize logistic problems identified during
Phase 0: Concept Exploration. Ship characteristics, HM&E, and certain systems are
finalized while others are further refined. Supportability and manufacturing process
design considerations should be integrated into the system design effort early to preclude
costly redesign efforts downstream in the process. As will be discussed in further detail
in subsequent sections, the program office, design office, contractors, and Navy
laboratories are all usually involved in this phase of the program. These entities are
involved in the following efforts:
e Creation of updated assessment of the military threat
e Consideration of technology and technical risk
e Refinement of cost objectives and affordability assessment
" Identification of major cost, schedule, and performance tradeoff opportunities
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* Refinement of acquisition strategy and determination of initial, low-rate
production
e Identification of a test and evaluation strategy and appropriate testing
* Assessment of the industrial capability to support the program
* Identification of proposed cost, schedule, and performance objectives and
thresholds for approval
* Assessment of potential environmental impacts
* Verification that adequate resources have been programmed to support
production, deployment, and support
e Identification of cooperative opportunities
* Ensuring of compliance with international arms control agreements
" Creation of a proposed oversight and review strategy to include a description
of mandatory program information
* Refinement of Cost as an Independent Variable (CaIV) objectives
* Analysis of any major technology and industrial capability issues
* Creation of Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) and Manpower Estimate
The preliminary design typically takes 6-12 months and leads to the start of
contract design. The contract design usually requires 9-15 months. In the past, the
contract design has been the engineering development of the technical and contractual
definition of the ship design (including ship specifications and drawings) to a level of
detail sufficient for prospective shipbuilders to make a sound estimate of the construction
cost and schedule. The contract design package has traditionally provided the technical
baseline from which the Navy selects the shipbuilder who then develops the detail design
package required supporting the construction and eventual delivery of the ship.
Under the Acquisition Reform for new design ships, traditional distinct phasing of
the design process has been replaced with a continuous, concurrent engineering,
Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) process extending through and after
contract award. This serves to maintain the focus of multi-discipline teams consisting of
the government, shipbuilder, system programs, and suppliers. Government/Industry
Integrated Product Team(s) (IPTs) will utilize the IPPD process to develop the design in
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an Integrated Product and Data Environment (IPDE.) The design approach is part of an
acquisition strategy that is based on commercial practices and incorporates a phased
technical definition.
A primary goal of this phase is to validate the choice of alternatives and to
provide the basis for determining whether to proceed into Phase II: Engineering &
Manufacturing Development. This is decided at the Milestone II review. Typically, an
RFP is issued during this phase to potential bidders. According to the current, generic
ship acquisition model, the transition of government personnel from design mode to
review mode takes place at this time. However, as will be discussed with the Sealift
program, this transition happened earlier in the process.
2.1.6 Milestone II
At this decision milestone, MDA should rigorously assess the affordability of the
program and establish a development Acquisition Program Baseline (APB.) The Defense
Planning Guidance, long-range modernization and investment plans, and internally
generated planning documents form the basis for making this assessment. Risks of the




e Phase I exit criteria status and Phase II exit criteria plans
" Validated threat assessment
* Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) quantities
* Prototyping/demonstration results
* Potential environmental consequences
* Adequacy of resources (manpower and funding)
* ICE and manpower estimate
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Milestone II approves the proposed or modified APB and acquisition strategy,
establishes life cycle cost objectives and exit criteria, identifies Low Rate Initial
Production (LRIP), and approves entry into Phase II: Engineering and Manufacturing
Development.
2.2 Final Comments
It is important to realize that the acquisition process described above is in its
generic form. The MDA can tailor the milestones and phases to support a specific
acquisition situation. "Tailoring" is one of the major themes of DoD 5000 as are the
ideas that, "one size does not fit all" and "there is no reason to expect to treat every
program identically." These phases and milestone decision points simply facilitate the
orderly translation of broadly-stated mission needs into system-specific requirements and
a stable design that can be produced efficiently.
Chapters 3-6 present the four programs included in this thesis. The acquisition
process undertaken as well as the total program spending leading up to Milestone II will
be included. All costs are shown in terms of actual dollars, unadjusted for inflation.
Chapter 7 provides a comparative analysis for these programs and evaluates several
hypotheses on acquisition reform based on findings in this thesis. Conclusions are made
in Chapter 8.
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3 DDG-51 ACQUISITION PROGRAM
The ARLEIGH BURKE Class of AEGIS-equipped guided missile destroyers is
designed as a replacement for the 15-year old LEAHY and BELKNAP Class cruisers in
conducting anti-air warfare, anti-submarine warfare and surface-to-surface warfare. The
DDG-51 Program is a 29-ship buy with the first ship operational in 1989 and the last ship
delivered in 1997. Bid price for the lead ship was $1,173,400,000 (1985 dollars). The
design effort began with Feasibility Studies in 1979 and ended with Contract Design
package signature on June 29, 1984. Principal particulars for the class are provided in
Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Principal Particulars for ARLEIGH BURKE Class
Displacement, full load (approx.) 8,300 tons
Length between perpendiculars 466 feet
Beam 59 feet
Draft, navigational 20.7 feet
Complement 21 officers, 286 men
Propulsion 4-LM2500 GTs, 2-CP propellers
40,000 SHP each
3.1 Design Strategy
In many ways, the DDG-51 program represents "the old ways of doing things."
The DDG-51 is a Navy design. The New Design, Conventional Approach was used.
Since this design departed from the basic DD963 hull and machinery plant, the DDG-51
design strategy was much closer to being a "clean sheet of paper design" and numerous
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feasibility and producibility studies were undertaken early on. Although the early stages
of the DDG-51 design were completed at the contractors' site (in terms of feasibility and
producibility studies) and the concept of collocation was applied to this project in the
contract design phase, the Navy maintained entire control over the design until contract
award at MS 1I. Representatives from prospective bid yards were on hand during
discussions to ensure that the design could be executed by several competing yards;
however, no funds were allocated for this purpose. During the early stages of the DDG-
51 design, viewpoints on the use of collocated teams conflicted. Most agreed that there
were obvious advantages to applying it; however, some felt that other programs might
suffer. In the end, the DDG-51 project was deemed of sufficient importance and
visibility to require collocation.
For all phases, the fraction of work performed by NAVSEA personnel was
assumed to be less than 20%. (In hindsight, the fraction of work actually performed by
in-house personnel in terms of man-days was only 12%.) Contractor support for this
program included multi-design agents by functional code. Management support was also
provided from outside NAVSEA. Table 3.2 presents the program's overall schedule.
Table 3.3 highlights key dates. Figure 3.1 also illustrates these time frames and
important dates.
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Table 3.2: Overall Schedule for DDG-51 Acquisition Program
START DATE COMPLETION DATE TOTAL LENGTH
Feasibility Study August 1978 March 1982 44 months
Conceptual Design February 1980 March 1982 26 months
Preliminary Design March 1982 December 1982 10 months
Contract Design May 1983 - June 1984 14 months
Total 68 months
Table 3.3: Key Dates in DDG-51 Acquisition Program
EVENT FEAS/CONCEPT PRELIMINARY CONTRACT
STUDY DESIGN DESIGN
SCIB N/A October 1982 N/A
Senior Review February 1982 December 1, 1982 May 15, 1984
Command Review February 1982 December 15, 1982 May 29, 1984
CD Circulation N/A N/A March 28, 1984
CD Reading Session N/A N/A May-June, 1984
CD Signature N/A N/A June 29, 1984
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As the program progressed through its stages, the number of key government
personnel on hand increased. Table 3.4 provides a list of key personnel for each phase.
New personnel in each phase are shown in bold.
Table 3.4: Key Personnel in DDG-51 Acquisition Program
Feasibility Studies Conceptual Design Preliminary Design Contract Design
Phase Phase Phase
4 personnel Ship Design Manager Ship Design Manager Director of Design
Deputy SDM Deputy SDM Ship Design Manager
Dsg'n Integration Mngr Dsg'n Integration Mgr Deputy SDM
TGM-Hull TGM-Hull Dsg'n Integration Mgr
TGM-Machinery TGM-Machinery TGM-Hull
TGM-C.S. Integration TGM-C.S. Integration TGM-Machinery












3.3 Development Costs of the DDG-51 Program
As was mentioned previously, the total design program ran from February 1980 to
March 1985. The program was awarded in July 1984; however, a definitization phase
took place until March 1985 that included proposal preparation and evaluation as well as
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contract negotiation and award support. The total design costs through March 1985 for
the DDG-51 Program (including the definitization phase) were $58.6 million.'
Information on annual monies spent was not available. However, Figure 3.2,
which shows in-house participation in design phases, was available. Using this figure as
well as the information on total spending by phase as guides, an estimate on fiscal year
spending is made in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of costs between government and industry
through Milestone II. In this figure, government represents the program office, design
office, and OGA. The design office will often contract Other Government Agencies
(OGA) to perform some technical tasks, especially in developmental stages. The David
Taylor Research Center (DTRC) is an example of an OGA, which often provides support
of hull development, model testing, etc. All numbers shown from this point on will not
include monies spent during the definitization phase for ease of comparison since all
programs in this thesis do not include this phase. Through Milestone II (i.e.-through
contract award), approximately 57% of the money ($27.8 M) was spent by industry with
the remaining 43% allocated to government effort.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show the breakdown of government into OGA and in-house
which would include the program office and design office. Of the 43% allocated to
government, in-house personnel spent 23% ($11.2 M); almost 20% ($9.5 M) was spent
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Figure 3.5: Total Design Costs by Performing Activity for DDG-51
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by OGA activities. It must be noted here that since consistent numbers were not provided
for in-house spending, an alternate method was used. The full-time in-house personnel
numbers in mandays were provided for each phase. These values were converted to
dollars spent using deflation from the assumed rate of $150K/man-year in FY96. A table
of these values is found in Appendix 1.
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show the cost breakdown by phase. The contract design
represented the bulk of the costs with 53%; concept studies represented only 12% of the
total costs, even though this phase lasted 44 months of the 68 months it took to get to
Milestone II. The preliminary design phase represented about one-third (35%) of the
total design costs.
3.3.1 Concept and Feasibility Design Costs
Costs for the concept and feasibility design phase of the program (Phase 0) were
just over $6 million as was shown Figure 3.8. Another source shows total spending
during this phase of $17.3 M. No further data existed to substantiate this value. It is the
estimation of NAVSEA personnel that this value may have included all activities not
directly related to the design of the DDG-5 1. Therefore, the value shown in Figure 3.8,
based on the method described previously, is used.
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show the breakdown of these costs into different activities.
During this phase approximately 73% ($4.4 M) went to industry. This is consistent with
the fact that a wide range of concepts was investigated during this phase, the majority of
which was done by industry. In-house efforts represented almost 19% ($1.1 M) while
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Figure 3.10: Concept & Feasibility Costs for DDG-51
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3.3.2 Preliminary Design Costs
Figures 3.11 and 3.12 show total costs to all parties during the Preliminary
Design. The total monies spent during this phase ($16.7 million) account for
approximately one-third of the total design costs. Both sides of government, in-house and
OGA, played a much greater role in this phase than in the concept and feasibility phase.
In-house effort totaled $3.8 M, roughly 23%, while OGA spent almost $5 M or 30% of
total preliminary design monies. Industry still put forth the majority of effort at 48%,
which totaled $8 M. As was the case in the concept and feasibility phase and will be
shown in the contract design phase, industry effort typically exceeds in-house effort
significantly. This has been the Navy approach toward design over the past twenty years.
Several reasons offered for this include:
* The desire to approach industry for solutions as it continues to incorporate
new technology
* The shrinking of government agencies
* The need to keep a stable design group
3.3.3 Contract Design Costs
The Contract Design phase amounted to approximately $29.7 million or 53% of
the total costs to Milestone II. Figures 3.13 and 3.14 illustrate the breakdown for these
costs. In-house effort was approximately equal to the preliminary design phase while the
OGA efforts decreased from almost 30% to about 15%. Total monies spent by these
activities were $6.2 M and $4.1 M respectively. As was just discussed, the majority of
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3.3.4 Task Group Funding
Key personnel brought on during the each phase in the DDG-51 design were
shown in Table 3.4. Figures 3.15 and 3.16 show effort levels by task group for the
design. The task groups were broken down into the following: Program Management,
Systems Engineering, Hull Engineering, Machinery, and Combat Systems Integration.
As was expected, the hull and machinery systems task groups made up the greatest effort
with 33% ($19.3 M) and 28% ($16.4 M) respectively. Program Management was the
third largest group with 21% or $12.3 M. One surprise for this type of warship was the
relatively small amount of monies spent by the combat systems integration group. This
group represented only 10%, less than $6 M. Approximately $4.7 M (8%) was spent by
the systems engineering group.
Due to the lack of consistent in-house data, effort levels by task group for each
phase in the design are not available. However, all task groups were allocated funds as
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4 USCGC ICEBREAKER ACQUISITION PROGRAM2
Following the Polar Icebreaker Requirements Study in 1984 and issuance of a
Mission Needs Statement in September 1984, the Coast Guard initiated the Polar
Icebreaker Replacement Program for building the USCGC Polar Icebreaker/Research
Vessel, the USCGC Healy. Subsequently, the Coast Guard prepared a preliminary
design and designated it the WAGB 20 Polar Icebreaker. Its characteristics are provided
in Table 4.1. The Coast Guard received the Department of Transportation's approval to
continue through the contract design phase.
Table 4.1: Principal Particulars for 460-Ft Contract Design Polar Icebreaker
Displacement, full load (approx.) 17,710 tons
Length overall 459' 6"
Beam 94' 6"
Draft, navigational 32'
Complement 30 scientists + 133 Crew & Avdet
Propulsion Diesel/Electric (AC-AC Cyclo
Converter) 30,000 SHP, 2 screws
Congressional Authorization was provided in FY90 for the construction of one
ship with the appropriation of $350 million. Funding for the ship came from
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) funds. As a result, representatives from
OMB, DOT, OSD, Navy, and the Coast Guard decided to direct the Navy to procure the
ship. PMS373 was chartered to carry out the program and was jointly staffed with seven
2 Parts of this chapter were taken from J. Tuttle's and H. Marcus's case study, USCGC Healy (Reference 4.)
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Navy and six Coast Guard personnel, managed by a Coast Guard captain. The Coast
Guard captain was there to ensure the Coast Guard's goals were not compromised. His
primary functions were to balance costs, schedules, and performance.
4.1 Original Acquisition Strategy
The acquisition strategy for the USCGC Healy had two distinct parts. The first
attempt reflected the "old way of doing things," similar to the DDG-51 program where
the Navy developed a contract design, sought sources for detailed design and
construction through a Commerce Business Daily (CBD) announcement, issued RFPs,
and awarded the contract. However, in the spring of 1992 the Naval Sea Systems
Command was forced to cancel the solicitation due to affordability issues. Nevertheless,
there was still enormous support for the program from the Navy, Coast Guard, and
Congress. In April of 1992 a team was organized to rethink the technical and
programmatic approach for this acquisition. As a result, the contract for detailed design
and construction of a Polar Icebreaker was awarded to Avondale Industries in July of
1993. The following sections discuss the failures of the first solicitation, regrouping
efforts, and the revised, and successful acquisition approach.
Shortly after the formation of PMS373, the Coast Guard contract-design package
for the WAGB 20 Polar Icebreaker was reviewed by NAVSEA to determine whether it
met Navy standards as buildable, biddable, and ready for release as part of an RFP. In
March 1991, over a dozen RFPs for detailed design with an option for construction were
sent to prospective shipyards. Only two shipyards submitted proposals, Avondale
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Industries, Inc. and Ingalls Shipbuilding Division of Litton Industries. The limited
response was due to the perceived risk on behalf of the shipyards for only one contract,
the lack of space available at some yards to construct a vessel of this size, and a loss of
interest by one yard after learning it had to use the government's design instead of its
own.
In August the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (ASN) gave Milestone II approval
and in September 1991 the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition approved the
contract type, Fixed Price Incentive. Proposals were received in October 1991, and the
source selection process commenced shortly thereafter. Discussions were initiated in
December and closed January 31, 1992. At that time, Best and Final Offers were
requested. The original procurement time line is shown in Figure 4.1.
4.2 Design Strategy
The preliminary and contract design for the USCGC Healy were developed in-
house by a USCG design team, with additional support from the joint USCG/Navy team
under PMS373 to bring it up to Navy standards. This was a major reason why the first
solicitation failed. Prominent American shipbuilders had grave reservations about the
producibility of the 460-ft ship. They stated that the design had little shipbuilder
influence; therefore, they believed it seriously lacked modern producibility
considerations. They cited the expensive use of compound curvature in the hull, and the
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fact all major ship's distributive system diagrams, provided as contract guidance, were
unsized. They believed the production would be painful and very expensive. As a result,
bid prices received exceeded the appropriated funding. Since money was limited, a
recommendation was made to cancel the solicitation. The official notice was issued in
March 1992.
Additional failures related to the design strategy include the perceived risk by the
shipbuilders in building a one-of-a-kind ship with technology not in common use in the
American marine industry. Documentation requirements in the solicitation such as the
requirement for finite element analysis were viewed as indicators of higher risks than
normal. Finally, a large number of major components were virtually sole-sourced which
stifled competition between vendors.
4.3 Second Acquisition Strategy
In April 1992, it was determined that the project's cost, as represented by the
average of the two responsive bids previously received, had to be reduced by
approximately $100 million to make the ship affordable with the available funds. Further
pressure came from the DoD's reissuance of the policy 5000 series instructions that
would require further documentation. In addition, the need to reduce the operating tempo
of the two operational polar icebreakers, USCGC's Polar Sea and Polar Star also added
pressure.
A team approach was developed to rework the Coast Guard Sponsor's
Requirements, rewrite the specifications, and develop an acquisition strategy. Members
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of the three teams were all in-house personnel. Senior members of one team would also
be members of other teams. The organization of these teams is shown in Figure 4.2.
One interesting note is that, compared to a normal USCG acquisition program, the
program manager had an unusual amount of freedom to choose, and later remove, team
members. A "core" team of eight persons met almost daily to discuss progress on the
three interlocking teams.
The new acquisition strategy focused on cost reduction and time compression. In order
to achieve these goals, competition was limited to Avondale and Ingalls since these were
the only yards that sent proposals for the 460-ft icebreaker and, therefore, had expended
considerable effort already. Furthermore, another full and open competition would likely
result in no additional competitors and would be fatal to the program. Figure 4.3
illustrates this point. In addition, it was decided that on-site government personnel during
early stages of design development were important. These personnel were organized into
Specification Reading and Review Conference (SRRC) teams.
The contracting approach was also unique in this program. In rewriting the
contract, two options were considered: option 1, the standard contract design approach;
option 2, a modified "quick-time" approach. The main reason supporting the standard
design approach, which would involve full and open competition, was that the shipyards'
main experience was in detail design and construction. Furthermore, presenting the yard
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design issued by PMS373 may overburden the shipbuilder financially. The alternative
was to allow the yards to come up with a design based on a government proposal. This
meant PMS373 would have to clearly define their needs (in terms of performance-based
requirements) to guarantee a desirable final product.
There were two major drawbacks to the contract design approach. First, time was
playing against them. It was estimated that 12-19 months would be required to execute a
new contract design. Second, there was no assurance that the costly producibility
problems from the first solicitation would be overcome.
The alternative contracting method used two phases. The first phase of the
contract included awarding each yard $200K to develop an Engineering Design Baseline
(EDB) which was roughly between preliminary design and contract design. The
government planned to review the EDBs during source selection to insure the EDBs
could meet requirements. Each yard was then invited to submit a proposal for the Detail
Design and Construction option for an EDB-based vessel. The second phase would begin
after exercising the contract option of the successful yard.
Instead of opting for the lowest bidder, as has been done historically, the EDB
competition proposals were rated from a "Best Value" perspective. This meant the best
technical design and price combination. Thus, proposal reviewers could exercise
judgment and score on a descriptive rather than a numeric scale. The downside to this
approach was that it required more documentation of the evaluation process. In reality,
the contractors did not like the Best Value approach since they did not know whether
technical or cost standards were more important to the government.
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As was mentioned earlier, the SRRC approach was considered a cornerstone to
this acquisition strategy. On-site teams of government personnel were available to
answer technical questions, clarify requirements, and evaluate proposed technical
solutions. Technical personnel at NAVSEA controlled the flow of information to both
yards without compromising design ideas from either. This was risky, but highly
effective. The presence of on-site teams had several advantages. First, open discussions
allowed quick solutions to simple problems of interpretation. Second, both the
government and contractor had opportunities to influence the design process early on and
head off problems that could cause delays later. Third, it promoted good working
relationships and reduced the adversarial process that often occurs.
This approach, however, had its shortcomings. First, a significant amount of
technical personnel at NAVSEA were needed to ensure both teams got the same
information without compromising the competitive design of either yard. In this process,
government personnel from one team were not allowed to discuss progress with their
colleagues working on another team. They also took no part in the final design selection
for contract award. In addition, skilled government personnel were needed at
"headquarters" to oversee progress for both teams and protect against unfair
informational advantages. Finally, it was vital that all elements of the shipyard's
organization participated in the early stages. Otherwise, lack of commitment could
become a problem in the next phase.
Reading sessions on the revised SOR took place in late August. The revised SOR
had an emphasis on commercial standards as opposed to MilSpecs and Standards. Time
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constraints prohibited the reading of the whole specification. Approximately one-third
was read with an emphasis on the sections that either changed during the rewrite or had
the most operational impact. In hindsight, this was a serious error since many
inconsistencies were found in later phases of the project. The review process was slow,
but was really the only way to properly perform a review. The process was also an
excellent way for SRRC team members to come up to speed on sections which they were
not directly involved with rewriting.
After a post-award conference in Gulfport, Mississippi where the yards were
given the official SOR, the two SRRC teams were dispatched to each yard. The speed
with which questions were fielded, reviewed, and forwarded and responded to was
crucial for this process. Responses were communicated in less than 10 days. The SRRC
process was superior to the standard clarification scheme since it allowed the government
to help open communication and sped up the design process. Both shipyards asked more
than 1200 questions overall; 600 of these were common. Approximately 400 changes
were made to the SOR due to these questions. The SRRC averaged twenty-two questions
per day and on some days as many as fifty. One shipyard believed it was able to lower its
bid by $35 million because better understanding of requirements reduced their risk.
Designs and pricing proposals came in April 1993 and review started almost at
once. An award was made on July 15, 1993. Information on the change in bid price
from the original offer is shown in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: Change in Bid Price from Winning Shipyard
ORIGINAL BID FINAL BID
Length 460 feet 420 feet
Light Ship Displacement 11,547 LT 10,909 LT
(less all margins)
Total Costs $276.9 Million (1991) $229 Million (1991)
4.4 Development Costs of the USCGC Icebreaker Program
Due to the unique circumstances of the USCGC Icebreaker program, the format
of the new acquisition reform divisions has been applied in the following way:
Pre-Phase 0: 1973-1978
Phase 0: 1978-March 1992
Phase I: April 1992 - August 1992
Phase II: September 1992 - August 1993
Under this format, costs incurred during the first acquisition attempt are included in
Phase 0. Pre-Phase 0 costs included feasibility studies from the first acquisition attempt.
Phases I and II are as described above.
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 illustrate total costs up to contract award, relative to the total
program budget for the acquisition of one ship. The total ship budget was $350 M. Total
costs up to contract award were $12.5 M. Design costs represented less than 4% of the
total acquisition budget. Thus, as is the case with most surface ship acquisition


























to keep in mind that by Milestone II approximately 80% of total costs for the remainder
of the program are fixed. Therefore, greater efforts made during the initial phases, and
therefore a greater slice of the pie, may in fact reduce the overall size of the pie.
This was seen to a certain extent during the second attempt at acquisition. By
involving the shipyards in the design of the vessel, a design that was easier to produce
resulted, and the shipyard was able to shave $48 M from the bid price thus reducing the
overall size of the pie.
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show the cost breakdown according to the assumed phasing.
One item to note is that there are significantly higher costs up front because this
represents a total attempt at acquisition by applying "the old way of doing things" that
was ultimately unsuccessful. Ignoring the Phase 0 costs for a moment, the trends
illustrated by the other phases are consistent with other programs examined in this thesis.
More money is spent as the program moves closer to the award date.
One lesson learned here, that will be brought up again later, is the fact that in the
initial acquisition program, approximately $9.5 M was spent but did not result in a
contract award despite the overwhelming support from all sides. As a result, the
government needed to spend an additional $3 M to have a successful contract award. By
spending a little more up front, the end result was a vessel that was indeed biddable and
buildable. This additional $3 M resulted in a cost savings of $48 M. That is a significant
return on investment!
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 illustrate the cost breakdown between government and
industry. In this case, government included PMS 373, Acquisition Icebreaker (AIB)
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team, Coast Guard Engineering (ENE), NAVSEA 03, and to a small extent, Supship.
Industry consisted primarily of shipyards and design firms. Government effort totaled
$8.1 M (65%) while industry represented only 35%, $4.4 M. This represents a deviation
from typical Navy acquisition programs in recent years. Again, we can see the lesson
learned from this type of cost breakdown. The lesson is this: without sufficient
involvement from industry at an early point in the process, the probability of successfully
making it to contract award and having an acceptable vessel at the end of the acquisition
process is significantly reduced. This will be discussed again later.
At the time of this publication, no data was available on task group efforts.
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5 STRATEGIC SEALIFT ACQUISITION PROGRAM3
Andrew Speirs prepared a thorough case study on the Sealift Acquisition program
in his thesis, Right Sizing for Government Review (Reference 2). Since this section will
only partially summarize the work he did, readers interested in a detailed analysis on the
program should obtain a copy of this source.
The T-AKR 310 class Strategic Sealift Program arose out of a need for suitable-
size ships capable of fast sealift logistical missions. Following the Gulf War, a mobility
requirements study for the US DoD resulted in the creation of a $2.4 billion budget for an
additional 19 sealift ships. Sealift ships are essential to military forces in the deployment
of military cargo in both the pre-positioning of forces for deterrence or coercion and also
in the surge of military intervention. Responsibility for the US Army, Navy, and Air
Force sealift operations lies with the Military Sealift Command of the US Navy. The
mission of the Strategic Sealift ships is the deployment of military cargoes to anywhere in
the world. Table 5.1 shows the principal particulars for the new construction Strategic
Sealift vessels.
3 Much of the content and wording of this section came from A. Speirs' thesis Right Sizing for Government
Review June 1998, pages 30-53 (Reerence 2).
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Table 5.1: Principal Particulars for Strategic Sealift
Displacement at design draft 62,700 LT
Length between perpendiculars 905 feet
Beam, molded 105 ft. 9 in.
Draft, design 34 feet
Complement 13 officers, 32 unlicensed
Propulsion 2-LM2500 GTs, 2-CP propellers
32,000 BHP each
5.1 Acquisition Strategy
The program was first funded in November 1989, when the FY90 defense
appropriations bill approved $600 million in Ship Construction and Conversion, Navy
(SCN) funds for sealift. Figure 5.1 shows a timeline of major events occurring in this
program. This program consisted of both new construction and conversion; however, for
purposes here, only monies spent toward new construction are of interest. The summer
months of 1991 marked significant activity for the Sealift program. In June the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (ASN) directed NAVSEA to commence preparation of documents
to support the acquisition process, including appropriate streamlining measures. In July a
draft of the Mission Needs Statement (MNS) was issued, and the SECNAV approved the
general concept of the program. In August, NAVSEA issued an RFP for initial designs
to US shipyards. Later that month, the MS 0 was scheduled and suggested the use of this
program as a major defense acquisition pilot program. Nine shipyards responded to the
RFP for initial design. The MS 0 review was held August 30, 1991. In September,
concept design contracts were awarded to these nine shipyards.
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In June 1992, the MNS for Strategic Sealift was approved. The Program Office,
PMS 385, was also established at this time. MS I occurred in August 1992. New
construction design contracts were issued to 7 of the 9 initial shipyards on November
1992. August 1993 marked the MS II program decision meeting for new construction.
On September 2, 1993 Avondale Industries, Inc. was authorized to construct one ship
with options for five additional ships. On September 15, 1993 NASSCO was authorized
to construct one ship also, with the options for five others. Table 5.2 shows the duration
of acquisition phases in the Strategic Sealift program.
Table 5.2: General Schedule for Strategic Sealift Program
START DATE END DATE DURATION
Concept & Feasibility FY90 FY91 12 months
Preliminary Design FY91 FY92 3 months
Contract Design FY92 FY93 9 months
5.2 Design Strategy
The Sealift program was one of the first Navy programs to break from the
traditional mold of Navy in-house design. In this program, transitional steps were taken
to change the role of government from being one of design to one of essentially review
and contractual functions.
This program marked a change in the role of the shipyards. In most previous
programs, the Navy did the feasibility studies, preliminary design, and contract design in-
house, with the support of design agents. The Sealift program involved the shipyards to
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do this work. Shortly after MS 0, the shipyards that responded to the RFP were
contracted to perform the initial design studies. This means that industry comes up with
the different designs that will satisfy the requirements that the government has set. This
reduced the government's role in design, and shifted the bulk of the work to a design
review function.
This change toward government as review body, although not easy to implement,
was considered by most to be an effective way to manage the acquisition product. This
process was structured to review a large amount of information fairly and consistently.
Approximately 18 concept design reviews were held in addition to 28 new-construction
design reviews. This required a core of forty government personnel and design agents
with as many as seventy at times. This review process varied from the Icebreaker
program in that the government personnel attending the reviews were essentially the
same at each review to maintain consistency. A core of nine people was established for
this task. Support contractors were not present for these reviews.
Further variation on the Icebreaker theme was the fact that government personnel
were not involved as part of the shipyard teams. Thus, all government personnel could
communicate with each other on the development of various designs. All questions and
answers were private between the shipyard and the program office; however, if in
answering a question, the requirement was clarified and could significantly affect
teghnical development, strategy, or cost, it would be shared with other yards.
Approximately 500 formal questions were asked in the Engineering Design Phase.
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Another difference between this program and other Navy acquisition programs
was the reduced cycle time for the design. A generic ship acquisition program usually
takes 3 to 18 months to complete feasibility and concept studies. Table 5.2 shows this
phase lasted only took 12 months. Preliminary design and contract design of a typical
Navy ship acquisition program can last anywhere from 6 to 12 months and 9 to 15
months, respectively, combining to a total of 15 to 27 months. Table 5.2 shows this
combined process took only 12 months in the Strategic Sealift program. Of course, it
should be kept in mind that this is a non-combatant vessel.
5.3 Development Costs of the Strategic Sealift Program
The total design costs through MS II for the Strategic Sealift program were $44.9
million. The total Sealift program costs amount to approximately $5.9 billion. Thus,
total design costs represented less than 1% of total program costs. Figure 5.2 is an
approximation of the timing of the design costs according to Speirs, 1998. There is
significant funding in the first year, which then drops off. The first year includes funding
for the conceptual designs, feasibility studies, etc. After that stage, the spending drops
off, and generally builds towards MS II. The engineering designs took place almost
exclusively in FY 1993, which is reflected in the figure.
Of the design costs, Figure 5.3 shows that the government incurred 37% of the
costs, while 63% were associated with private industry. The costs included in the
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Figure 5.2: Timing of Design Costs for Sealift Program
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Note: These costs are an
estimate. Many of the funds
appropriated can be used over
a multi-year period. These
costs represent a best guess of








Figure 5.3: Total Design Effort for Sealift Program
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The industry segment included contractors that supported the program management and
design effort, shipyards, and regulatory bodies.
It becomes apparent in Figure 5.3 that the majority of the design costs in the
program were in industry. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 illustrate the breakdown of costs for
various players in the Strategic Sealift design. These diagrams indicate the significance
that industry had in the design of the Strategic Sealift program. The Navy's Program
Office and Design Office, synonymous with the term "in-house," made up only 11% of
the total design costs, or $44.9 million. The remaining cost of the design without these
two players was $39.9 million. The majority of costs associated within the government
came from OGA, which was constituted primarily of the cost of David Taylor Research
Center (DTRC).
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 illustrate the cost of each phase in the design. The bulk of the
design cost for the Sealift program, similar to most Navy programs, was during the
contract design phase. Relatively little money was spent in the concept and feasibility
design phase, only 6%. The preliminary design phase represented approximately 1/3 of
the total design cost.
5.3.1 Concept and Feasibility Design Costs
The concept and feasibility design phase of the program cost approximately $2.6
million. Again, this was approximately 6% of the total design cost of $44.9 million.
Figures 5.8 and 5.9 show the breakdown of costs within concept and feasibility design.
The outside contractors spent the largest amounts of funds in this phase. Design firms
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were relatively insignificant in comparison to the total design effort, and particularly with
respect to the entire acquisition program.
5.3.2 Preliminary Design Costs
The preliminary design phase of the program cost approximately $15.6 million, or
35% of the total design costs. The cost allocation of this design phase is shown in
Figures 5.10 and 5.11. The government had a larger role in this phase compared with the
concept and feasibility stage; approximately 48% of the costs of this phase were
associated with government organizations. The US shipyards were not involved in the
concept and feasibility studies, but did become involved in the preliminary design, with
contracts worth $2.25 million, or approximately 14% of the costs of this phase. As in the
concept and feasibility design stage, the design firms were allocated the largest piece of
the pie, at least 35%.
5.3.3 Contract Design Costs
The contract design phase of the program cost over $26.7 million, or roughly 59%
of the total design costs. Figures 5.12 and 5.13 show the breakdown of this design phase.
The Navy's Program Office and Design Office had relatively small roles in this phase, at
approximately 4% and 3%, respectively. OGA, however, consumed almost $6.4 million,
or 24% of this phase. Shipyards did the largest portion of work, with over $10 million
dollars and 39% of the costs associated with this phase. The role of the design firms was
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Figure 5.13: Contract Design Costs for Sealift Program
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6 LPD-17 ACQUISITION PROGRAM
In 1990, the Navy and Marine Corps completed a joint study on amphibious
operations. This study revealed the following:
1) several of the Amphibious Force ship classes today are reaching the end of
their service lives (27 ships are projected to reach the end of their service lives
by FY2000)
2) other classes are no longer capable of fully performing their original mission.
As a result, the LPD-17 class of amphibious transport dock ships is a functional
replacement of four amphibious ship classes: LPD, LSD, LST, and KLA classes. This
study also defined the optimum size (lift capacity) for the LPD- 17 ship class that would
make up the projected lift shortfall resulting from the retirement of these other
amphibious ship classes. This new class will be capable of accommodating a wide range
of deployment scenarios. In size and mission, the LPD-1 7's closest relative in today's
fleet is the LPD-4 class. Principal particulars for the LPD-17 class are provided in Table
6.1.
Table 6.1: Principal Particulars for LPD-17 Class
Displacement, full load (approx.) 24,800 tons
Length between perpendiculars 656 feet
Beam 105 feet
Draft, navigational 23 feet
Complement 32 officers, 34 CPO/NCO, 429
enlisted
Propulsion 4-geared diesels, 2-CP propellers
40,000 SHP
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Ships in this class will be the most highly technical and advanced amphibious
ships ever built. Combining key war fighting and command, control, communications,
computer, and intelligence capabilities, this class is an integral element in executing the
Navy's "Forward ... From the Sea" strategy beyond the turn of the century. The LPD- 17
ship class will embark, transport, land, and support amphibious assault forces of the
United States Marine Corps. It will be capable of supporting littoral operations across the
full spectrum of potential conflict.
6.1 Acquisition Strategy
The LPD-17 class program is the first Navy shipbuilding effort aimed at
minimizing military specifications and standards (MILSPECS) that allow contractors to
take advantage of cost-reducing commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies and non-
developmental items (NDI.) This is also the first major ship-acquisition program to
employ a totally electronic proposal evaluation process; the Navy's formal request for
proposal (RFP) was issued electronically by posting it on the Naval Sea System
Command's Contract Directorate home page. In addition, it is the first surface ship
program to be covered under the 1991 Defense Systems Acquisition Policy, as an ACAT
ID Major Program. It is required to be reviewed at all levels within the Navy and DoD
up to and including the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense.
The first ship in the class, USS San Antonio, and its 11 projected follow-on ships
are predicted to be models of the Navy's ongoing efforts in acquisition reform, making
efforts to improve the way in which the Navy designs, builds, acquires, and operates its
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fleet. The objective of this acquisition approach is to ensure that the most capable ships
are introduced into the fleet while simultaneously ensuring life-cycle affordability.
Tibbits and Keane point out that, "although the "feedback loop" for efforts made in ship
design and acquisition may be ten years, the trends are in the right direction" (Reference
1).
A key element of the new acquisition process was the requirement for a Cost and
Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA.) The COEA was performed during Phase 0
(Feasibility Studies), after passing MS 0 in November 1990, and must be updated prior to
each subsequent acquisition milestone. The COEA is an independent evaluation of the
effectiveness of each alternative against current and projected threats and an assessment
of capability versus cost of the program associated with acquiring each alternative.
On January 19, 1993, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition approved the
LPD-17 program to proceed into Phase I: Demonstration and Validation. This phase
included all preliminary design and contract design activities leading up to lead ship
award. On June 29, 1994, the Secretary of Defense directed the use of performance
specifications. This policy further authorized the use of non-government standards and
allowed the use of MilSpecs and Standards as a last resort. This policy was adhered to
and the LPD-17 contract specifications were released for proposals with approximately
150 MilSpecs and Standards.
In November 1994 a new program manager was appointed to the LPD-17
program with the designation PMS 317 (separate from the existing Amphibious Warfare
Program.) This new program manager implemented the Integrated Process and Product
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Development (IPPD) Team approach in early 1995 for the contract design phase. The
IPPD approach integrated Program Management, Ship Design, and Industry (potential
shipbuilders) for the final phases of design.
This innovative acquisition strategy was the first major ship program to blend
shipbuilding with a total ship systems integrator in the same contract. The result was a
Full Service Contractor (FSC) - two shipbuilding firms, a ships systems integrator, and
an IPDE systems developer. Most previous shipbuilding programs separated the entities
contractually with the Navy managing the interface. This new acquisition strategy
required the FSC to manage these interactions while the Navy management team focuses
on top level strategic direction.
There are several advantages to this strategy. First, it leaves the program office
free from the work-intensive efforts of refereeing between the prime contractor and its
sub-contractor integrators. This way, government talent can be dedicated to key
decision-making and top-level management issues. The values of concurrent engineering
where design and integration occur simultaneously were recognized. The relationships
between prime, sub-contractor and government incorporate efficiencies and facilitate
process execution that will ensure successful integration. This method emphasizes the
need to work side-by-side with both the owners and operators of the vessels.
In December 1995 the procurement year was accelerated to FY96. Contract
Design was signed in March 1996. A full and open competition was held for this
procurement and two proposals were received. In December 1996, Avondale Industries,
Inc. was awarded a $641.4 million cost-plus-award-fee contract for detail design,
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integration and construction of USS San Antonio (LPD- 17) with options for construction
of LPD-18 and LPD-19. Teaming with Avondale on this contract were General
Dynamics/Bath Iron Works, Hughes Aircraft Company and Intergraph Corporation. Bath
Iron Works was to participate in the detail design and will construct the LPD 19. The
contract included options that, if exercised, would bring the cumulative value of the
entire contract to $1.5 billion. Work was to be performed in Avondale, La (48%); Bath,
Maine (32%); Fullerton, Calif. (16%); and Waynesboro, Va. (4%.) The expected
delivery of LPD 17 was 67 months after contract award. Contract funds would not expire
at the end of the current fiscal year.
The acquisition strategy also envisioned a long-term relationship with the FSC.
"Full Service" does not just apply to the first ship construction contract, but continues
through subsequent construction under two separate contracts for follow-on ships. The
acquisition strategy anticipated the FSC would be tasked with life-cycle support and
planning yard responsibilities for the entire class for the duration of the LPD-17's
lifetime.
In August 1998, Avondale was awarded a $9.7 million modification to a
previously awarded contract for research, development, test and evaluation of new
technologies potentially applicable to the LPD-17 class ship. This modification covered
the exploration of various emerging innovative production processes, shipboard
automation techniques, and system design concepts with emphasis on reduced
maintenance, manning, and radar cross-section and improvements of structural design
concepts, electronics integration and habitability. Work was to be performed within
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Bath, Maine (38%), San Diego, Calif. (32%), and New Orleans, La.(30%) and is
expected to be completed in July 1999. Table 6.2 illustrates the approximate timing for
the LPD-17 design phase.
Table 6.2: General Design Schedule for the LPD-17 Program
6.2 Design Strategy
A multi-disciplinary, collocated NAVSEA design team under PMS 317 designed
the LPD-17. There were team members "representing the broad total ship 'disciplines'
such as producibility, cost, human engineering, computer-aided design, and reliability,
maintainability, and availability, as well as the more traditional system disciplines such as
hull, propulsion, and combat systems" (Reference 1). NAVSEA support contractors and
other Navy activity support were provided as required.
Collocation of the design team began very early on during the feasibility studies.
This was driven in part by the need to develop a large number of ship concept alternatives
to support the COEA/AoA decision-making process.
Direct shipbuilding industry involvement in the LPD- 17 design began during the
contract design phase. At this time, five competitively selected shipbuilders were
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START DATE END DATE
Concept & Feasibility FY91 FY92
Preliminary Design FY93 FY94
Contract Design FY94 FY96
brought onboard to help review the specifications, develop additional producibility
improvements, and comment on the implications of several aspects in the design. An
advantageous spin on this program was the teaming of shipbuilders and combat systems
integrators that took place to allow for a pooling of organizational strengths through
implementation of IPPD strategy.
Contractor personnel was available to the local representatives and the Design
Team at-large to support detailed design studies covering a wide range of technical and
management issues. Contractor and Navy activity support was obtained by the use of
RDT&E funds provided by the Ship Design Manager.
6.3 Development Costs of the LPD-17 Program
The total design costs through Milestone II for the LPD-17 Program were $67.7
million. Figure 6.1 illustrates the timing of the funding through Milestone II. As was
stated earlier, the bid price for the first ship was $641 million. The total design effort
through MS II represents only 10% of the bid price. The majority of the funding for
concept and feasibility studies was spent in FY91 ($6.5 million) with the remaining
monies spent in FY92 ($2.9 million.) Preliminary design costs of $11 million were
expended in FY93, leading to the contract design. The majority of funds through
Milestone II were spent in FY94 ($21 million), on contract design. Additional funds
were spent in FY95 and FY96 on contract design and activities leading to contract award
($28 million.)
Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of costs between government and industry
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office, and other government agencies (OGAs.) Through Milestone II, it is apparent that
industry represented the majority of design costs (58.7%.) Of the remaining 41.3%
allocated to the government, costs between the program and design offices totaled almost
23% and costs to OGAs totaled just over 18% (see Figure 6.3). Funds allocated to
industry through MS II totaled $39.7 million as shown in Figure 6.4. Funds to OGA
totaled $12.3 million; funds allocated to the program and design offices totaled $15.5
million.
Figures 6.5 and 6.6 show the cost breakdown by phase. As was stated earlier, the
majority of funds (70%) for the LPD-17 program were allocated to the contract design
phase. Funds for the contract phase totaled $47 million. Fourteen percent was spent on
concept and feasibility studies; the preliminary design phase represented the remaining
16% of total design costs up through Milestone II.
6.3.1 Concept and Feasibility Design Costs
The concept and feasibility design phase of the program cost was just under $9.5
million as was shown in Figure 6.6. Figures 6.7 and 6.8 show the breakdown of these
costs into different activities. During this phase, shipyards did yet have an active role in
the design process. Therefore, it is fair to say that the great majority of funds spent by
industry were to design agents and contractors. This cost totaled $4.7 million,
representing 50% of the budget for this phase. Twenty-nine percent, or $2.7 million, was
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6.3.2 Preliminary Design Costs
Figures 6.9 and 6.10 show the total costs to all activities during Phase 0:
Preliminary Design. The total monies spent during this phase, almost $11 million,
accounted for 16% of the total design costs for the LPD-17 program. Industry played a
much bigger role in this phase (63%) than in the concept and feasibility phase and
accounted for approximately $7 million. Total government effort for this phase (in terms
of monies spent) decreased. Both in-house and OGA spending accounted for
approximately $2 million each.
6.3.3 Contract Design Costs
Please recall that the IPPD teams between government and industry were
established between the preliminary and contract design phases. Shipbuilders had an
active role in the design process for the first time and accounted for a significant amount
of total industry spending. According to Figures 6.11 and 6.12, total spending by
industry in this phase amounted to $28 million, 60% of total monies spent during the
contract design phase. In-house spending totaled almost $11 million, or 23%. The
remaining 18%, or $8.3 million went to OGA.
6.3.4 Funding Distribution
As was seen in the DDG-51 analysis, an attempt is made here to understand the
personnel required by phase. Figures 6.13, 6.14, and 6.15 show the cost breakdown by
task group for each phase in the program. During the Concept and Feasibility Phase, the
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Figure 6.13: Concept Design Task Group Effort for LPD-17 Program
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Figure 6.14: Preliminary Design Task Group Effort for LPD-17 Program
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Figure 6.15: Contract Design Task Group Effort for LPD- 17 Program
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19% and 45% respectively. Specific tasks under the heading System Engineering include
design integration, producibility, and reliability, maintainability, and availability studies.
A third large contributor is the Combat Systems Integration group.
During the Preliminary Design phase, a slightly different distribution took place.
All six task groups accounted for at least 10% of total funds for the phase, with the
exception of groups consolidated in "other." These groups include ILS, materials, and
ship specifications groups. The Hull Engineering group spent 23% of the funds;
Machinery accounted for 17%; and the Combat Systems group made up 34% of costs for
this phase.
The Ship Design Management task group made up one-quarter of total costs spent
during the Contract Design phase. Other major task groups contributed between 15% and
20% each. We see in this phase that the government's role during this phase takes on a
greater focus toward management than in previous phases.
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7 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
In the previous sections of this thesis, four acquisition programs were presented
on their own, with total design costs shown unadjusted for inflation. This section will
present these programs together, in terms of 1998 dollars. Although it is impossible to
get a perfect "apples-to-apples" comparison among different programs, each unique in its
own way, several general hypotheses addressing total spending during the design process
leading up to MS II will be presented. Conclusions and recommendations will be drawn
from these hypotheses based on the approaches used in these four programs.
7.1 Total Design Costs
Total design costs for the four new-construction acquisition programs presented in
this thesis are shown in Table 7.1. Values shown in Table 7.2 have been adjusted to 1998
dollars using the Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates (WEFA) Group, Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) inflation chart found in Appendix 1.
Table 7.1: Total Design Costs, uninflated, in $000's
CONCEPT & PRELIMINARY CONTRACT DESIGN TOTAL
FEASIBILITY DESIGN
$K % of $K % of $K % of total $K
total total
DDG-51 $6,046 12.5% $16,749 34.5% $25,705 53.0% $48,500
Icebreaker $9,547 76.5% $1,089 8.7% $1,845 14.8% $12,481
Sealift $2,618 5.8% $15,583 34.7% $26,745 59.5% $44,945
LPD-17 $9,440 14.0% $10,861 16.1% $47,317 70.0% $67,618
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Table 7.2: Total Design Costs (Inflated to 1998 dollars)
CONCEPT & PRELIMINARY CONTRACT DESIGN TOTAL
FEASIBILITY DESIGN
$K %of $K % of $K % of total $K
total total
DDG-51 $11,437 14.5% $27,328 34.6% $40,233 50.9% $78,998
Icebreaker $15,399 82.3% $1,247 6.7% $2,058 11.0% $18,704
Sealift $3,080 6.1% $17,842 35.2% $29,833 58.8% $50,754
LPD-17 $ 10,955 15.1% $11,972 16.5% $49,708 68.4% $72,635
These numbers are also illustrated in Figure 7.1.
One trend to note is that the type of vessel to be designed drives total design
spending. DDG-51 and LPD-17 have extensive combat capability and cost a significant
amount more to design than the Icebreaker and Sealift. The Sealift, still with a relatively
high level of complexity, costs $20 M less to design. Finally, the Icebreaker, as expected,
was the least costly program reviewed in this thesis. Reasons for this are the fact that the
Icebreaker is a smaller vessel, single vessel program. It is no combat capability and its
systems are not as complex as the other ship programs.
Judging from Figure 7.1, it would be possible to say that some percentage of the
$6.5 M difference between DDG-51 and LPD-17 is due to the acquisition approach
taken, although the actual breakdown is difficult to discern. Finally, Figure 7.2 shows
total spending through MS II as a percentage of first ship cost.
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Figure 7.2: Total Design Costs as Percent of Bid for Lead Ship Detailed Design and Construction
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7.2 Concept Design Spending
The concept design cost breakdown by activity group is shown in Figure 7.3 for
the DDG-51, Sealift, and LPD-17 programs. The Icebreaker program, primarily because
it is not a military ship and because design costs may be understated since money was
spent on design prior to the official acquisition program began, is not included in the
comparison. In all three of these programs, industry contributions during this phase are
primarily from design agents and.not from shipyards. Regardless of how industry is
represented during this phase, it is clear that the majority of funds during this phase were
allocated to industry. The participation by OGA varied. With the exception of LPD-17
where it accounted for 29%, in-house typically represented less than 20% of total design
costs.
7.3 Preliminary Design Spending
Figure 7.4 illustrates activity group spending during preliminary design. In-house
contributed about 20% for all three programs; OGA efforts ranged from 20% to 30%.
During the DDG-51 preliminary design, the majority of industry funding was spent on
design agents rather than on shipbuilders. In the Sealift program, shipyards accounted for
roughly 14% with design firms contributing 35%. Industry represented over 60% of
LPD-17 preliminary design spending. It is difficult to break out design agents versus
shipyards for this program. However, it is estimated that the majority of these costs
associated with industry were still for design agents during this phase. Please recall that
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in the Sealift program, seven shipyards were contracted to develop preliminary designs
while in-house personnel maintained an arm's length approach as reviewer. In the LPD-
17 program, shipyards were involved in the preliminary design, but IPPD teams (which
included NAVSEA personnel assigned to each team) were not created until the beginning
of contract design.
7.4 Contract Design Spending
Contract design spending for the DDG-5 1, Sealift, and LPD- 17 is shown in Figure
7.5. Again, the majority of industry funding was spent on design agents rather than
shipyards in the DDG-51 program. In the contract design phase, 60% of spending went
to industry. Based on the acquisition approach taken in the DDG-51 program, the "old
way of doing things," the effort by in-house and OGA are consistent, 24% and 16%
respectively. Likewise, based on the type of approach implemented for the Sealift
program, of competitive, industry-based contract designs, the70% level of effort by
industry, with shipyards accounting for 40% and design agents only 15%, is consistent.
With in-house maintaining the role of reviewer at 6.5%, OGA makes up the difference
with 24%. What is very interesting is the comparison between the DDG-51 and LPD- 17
programs for industry spending. The amount of industry effort for both programs is
about 60%; however, there has been a transition over time from the majority of the
money spent on design agents to the majority of the money being spent on shipyards.
This trend continues in the DD-21 program currently underway.
122



















Figure 7.6: In-house Mandays
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OGA Mandays by Phase
DDG-51 Sealift LPD-17
Concept/Feasibility 5321 975.3 2084
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7.5 Manpower Levels
Total mandays for each program, by phase and activity, are shown in Figures 7.6,
7.7, and 7.8. Mandays for the Icebreaker program were not available. The most obvious
conclusion from Figure 7.6, In-house Mandays, is that the complexity of combatant
programs requires much greater effort than non-combatant programs and are, therefore,
much more expensive. Furthermore, once the effort has evolved into a major program,
with multiple ships, absolute mandays are relatively constant. Design costs, expressed as
a function of bid, will vary as the price of the bid varies. In-house mandays for DDG-51
made up 12% of total mandays as opposed to 17% for LPD-17. Total mandays are
determined from summing mandays in Figures 7.6-7.8. When comparing DDG-51 and
LPD-17 programs, the type of work done by in-house personnel has evolved from
designer to program reviewer. However, this increase from 12% to 17% seems
inconsistent with recent downsizing efforts within governmental agencies. This increase
could be due to the added time needed for IPPD team set-up and training, software
developments, program delays, as well as the focus on TOC in the LPD-17 program.
Programs in the past have not focused on TOC reductions. Furthermore, although there
have been manning cutbacks within NAVSEA, there have also been fewer large
programs. Thus, personnel are able to shift between programs. Finally, the total length
of the DDG-51 program was 50 months whereas the LPD-17 program was 74 months.
Thus, on a per year basis, the average number of personnel for the LPD-17 program is
less than for the DDG-51 program. This is shown in Figure 7.9.
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Timing of Design Stages (months)
DDG-51 Icebreaker Sealift [ LPD-17 IGeneric Ship*
Concept 26 29 12 26 3-18
Preliminary Design 10 5 3 23 6-11
Contract Design 14 11 9 25 9-16
Total 50 45 24 74 18-45








1S Concept/Feasibility 1 Preliminary ED Contract
Figure 7.9: Data for Determining Average In-house Manyears per year
n-house Manyears by Phase per year (=personnellyear
DDG-51 Sealift LPD-17
Concept/Feasibility 15 3 10
Preliminary 32 86 7
Contract 36 17 43
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Figure 7.7 illustrated OGA mandays. It is difficult to make conclusions from this
information. Figure 7.8 showed industry mandays. Industry includes design agents as
well as shipyards. From this graph, one conclusion is that there is a trend toward
increased industry involvement. As was mentioned earlier, there is also a definite trend
toward earlier shipyard involvement, which has led to a greater role played by shipyards
than by design agents. The effects of the IPD team for the LPD- 17 program are shown in
the fact that industry involvement during contract design has increased significantly.
Although there was a significant amount of industry participation during the designing of
the Sealift program, the lower level of complexity for this non-combatant required fewer
mandays overall.
7.6 Task Group Effort
Task group effort for total design through MS II is shown in Figure 7.10 for the
DDG-51 and LPD-17 programs. These numbers were not available for either the
Icebreaker or Sealift programs at the time this thesis was published. Program
management effort was much greater for the LPD-17 program than for the DDG-51
program. This was also the case for hull engineering and machinery systems. Systems
engineering and combat systems integration task groups played a smaller role for the
LPD-17 program than for the DDG-51 program.
7.7 Hypotheses on Acquisition
In the remainder of this chapter, the author presents several hypotheses
concerning the Navy acquisition process. These hypotheses are evaluated based on the
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Figure 7.10: Total Task Group Spending through Milestone 11.
data presented previously as well as the knowledge the author has gained from
performing this thesis. Hypotheses directly relating to the data provided are discussed
first. Subsequent hypotheses are consistent with literature reviewed on this topic, and
while may not be either proved or disproved by data collected here, are nonetheless
enlightening.
Hypothesis 1: Although there have been great changes in the acquisition process, the
changes in design cost, in-house mandays, and industry effort have been minor.
Great strides have been made in, among other areas, streamlining the total
acquisition process, increasing industry involvement, and focusing on total ownership
costs (TOC). However, despite these changes, the procedure of acquiring a new
combatant, especially a multi-ship program like the DDG-51 and LPD-17, requires an
enormous amount of effort. Total design costs as a percent of lead ship costs may vary as
a function of the bid, however; Table 7.2 illustrated that, in terms of 1998 dollars, total
design costs to MS II for both the DDG-51 and LPD-17 were roughly $75 million.
Regardless of whether in-house personnel are performing the design, acting as reviewers,
or a hybrid of the two, a pool of qualified government personnel existed to sustain the
program. Finally, the transition in industry involvement from design agents to shipyard
(and design agents) has been seen over time and will continue through the current DD-21
program and beyond. This transition has not greatly changed industry costs for these
programs.
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Hypothesis 2: Design costs are minor relative to first ship bid and, moreover, are
insignificant compared to total costs of a multi-ship program. Thus, more money
invested up front should result in significant savings to total design.
This relates to the philosophy of concurrent engineering taught by Huthwaite
(Reference 5). Concurrent engineering applies the precept that the successful designer
considers all product life-cycle aspects from the beginning of a design, all the way
through to disposal.
It recognizes that a product is the sum of its life-cycle processes, not just the sum
of its individual parts (Reference 1).
He states there are three truths that form the basis for concurrent engineering.
The first truth is that,
Design is the primary driver of quality, cost, and time.
As was previously stated in this thesis, and is shown in Figure 7.11, most would agree
that the design drives approximately 70% to 80% of the total life-cycle cost. As Figure
7.12 shows, the cost incurred through contract award at MS II, the time period reviewed
by this thesis, represents only a small fraction of total cost to develop a new warship (or
any commercial item.) This figure further points out that by MS II, the amount of cost
and performance "locked in" is enormous. Consequently, greater efforts made during the
initial phases, and therefore a greater slice of the pie, may in fact reduce the overall size
of the pie.
Certainly, as was seen in Figure 7.2, design costs are very small compared to the
bid price for the first ship. The Icebreaker program only included one ship; however,
design costs represented only 5% of the total program costs. Furthermore, for multi-ship
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FIRST TRUTH: Design is the primary driver
of quality, cost and time J
programs, the design costs are insignificant when compared to the total costs for the
program. The figure shows design costs as 5%of total program costs. Design costs for
the programs reviewed here were even less. For both the DDG-51 and Sealift programs,
design costs through MS II represented less than 1% of total program costs. The LPD-17
program is still underway, but there is no doubt that this trend will also prove true for the
LPD-17 program. The reference to the majority of costs "locked in" by MS II is seen in a
more qualitative sense than with actual numbers. By MS II, there exists not only a
concept to be further developed but also an actual design requiring only further
massaging through detailed design to prepare for construction. This statement has also
held true for the programs reviewed here.
There are three effective measures to test this hypothesis on the programs
presented here. First, the amount of change-order costs required, with the exception of
changes made at request of customer (and not driven by discrepancies in design), gives a
good indication on the quality of the design by MS II. Second, time overruns against the
projected delivery date could also, to a lesser extent, measure whether enough time and
money was invested in the design phase. Certainly, events out of the control of
designers, schedulers, and planners such as a labor strike or other delays in yard
operations, would need to be extracted. The third measure focuses on total ownership
costs.
Change-order costs on the lead ship for the DDG-51 program were $87.6 million
in real dollars ($124.5 M in 1998 dollars). This is almost $10 million greater than design
costs through MS II. As of the print date for this thesis, change order costs for the LPD-
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17 program were not publicly available. Change-order costs for the Icebreaker,
approximately $23 M, totaled 6.6% of the total program budget. The design phase of the
Icebreaker represented only 3.6% of the total budget. Change-order costs for the Sealift
program totaled $324 M, 5.5% of the total budget. However, the design phase
represented less than 1% of the program budget. In layman's terms, if double the amount
of money was spent to obtain a better Sealift design before MS II, the government would
need to save only 14% of the change-order costs. Savings beyond this would be savings
to the Navy and US taxpayer! (Reference 2).
Total Ownership Costs (TOC) was a key tenet in the LPD- 17 program. In today's
environment, the Navy cannot afford to operate as in the past. TOC reductions focus on
all cost drivers, combining research and development, design and traditional ship
construction costs with life cycle operating and support costs. The TOC process is
integrated with the total ship development process and is a component of all team
activities. Figure 7.13 depicts the relative relationship of initial design, acquisition, and
operating and support costs as viewed from a TOC perspective. The LPD-17 program
would consider paying a premium in acquisition, within budget constraints, to obtain
significant savings during the 40-year life of each ship of the class.
Hypothesis 3: Greater industry involvement early on will result in a "better" end-
product (in terms of producibility, affordability, and operationability.)
This is really at the heart of why concurrent engineering and IPPD theory should be






Figure~7J3LPD 17 TOC Breakout
137
spectrum of knowledge to bring to the design table. The third truth of concurrent
engineering is,
Multi-functional teams are the keys to solving the total design equation.
Tibbits and Keane expand on Huthwaite's third truth in saying "basic concurrent
engineering is best carried out by multi-functional teams, led by a strong product
manager (like NAVSEA Ship Design Managers)." Furthermore, life cycle "process
owners" need to participate from the earliest stages in the design. These concepts are
relayed in Figure 7.14.
In the past, warship design/acquisition strategies have tended to be "bi-polar" in
the sense that the choices were either a Navy design or an industry design. Since the
DDG-51 program, when the idea of collocation was first applied, to the present time,
NAVSEA has continued to pursue earlier and closer relationships with industry. As a
general rule, many believe that contract design will always be too late to bring the
shipbuilders in because most of the critical design decisions have been made by then.
Ideally, the shipbuilders should actively participate in the design process, not serve as
after-the-fact reviewers.
We saw in the USCGC Icebreaker program that one of the major reasons why the
first contract attempt failed was the lack of involvement from the shipyards. Thus, the
design was perceived as not producible, among other things. In the USCGC Icebreaker
program, government effort totaled $8.1 M (65%) while industry (primarily shipyards but
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typical Navy acquisition programs in recent years. The lesson was learned here from this
type of cost breakdown. Without sufficient involvement from shipyards at an early point
in the process, the probability of making it to contract award and having an acceptable
vessel at the end of the acquisition process is significantly reduced.
Another example of the success of early involvement with shipbuilders was also
seen in the Icebreaker. After the original program failed, the shipyards were consulted on
the design and allowed to develop their own design to submit, one yard reported a
savings of $35 M on the vessel bid price. Thus, early industry involvement can be a win-
win situation.
The effect of early shipyard involvement was demonstrated in the Sealift
program. Although this level of competition will most likely not be seen again, the effort
on behalf of the various shipbuilders resulted in a quality product in a significantly
shorter time frame than most Navy acquisition programs. Again, since this vessel is a
non-combatant, it is difficult to pull out the timesaving directly resulting from early
shipyard involvement. However, it is felt that some portion of the timesaving is a
function of the unique acquisition process undertaken in the Sealift program.
Several "early involvement" efforts to date for the LPD-17 have brought about
expected TOC savings in terms of cost, manpower, space, and weight. Examples include
manning reductions, equipment substitutions, paint coating systems, and self-cleaning
filters.
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Hypothesis 4: As shipbuilder responsibility increases and occurs at an earlier stage
in the design, the role of the "contractor" will change.
The term "contractor" refers to the technical support NAVSEA receives during
the design phase in terms of design agents, shipyards, and non-governmental research
labs. Figure 7.1 illustrated this point when comparing the total industry effort for the
DDG-51 program to that of the LPD-17 program. In the DDG-51 program, shipbuilders
were not heavily involved until after MS II. During LPD-17, shipbuilders were brought
in for the contract design phase on joint Navy-industry IPD teams. From this figure, we
see that although the industry spending remains 60% for both programs, design agents
were doing the majority of the work in DDG-51 whereas shipbuilders were doing the
majority of the work for the LPD-17 program.
Industry mandays were shown in Figure 7.8. In comparing the two combatant
programs, although mandays for DDG-51 and LPD- 17 are about the same, industry effort
represented 68% of total mandays for the DDG-51 program and 74% of total mandays for
the LPD-17 program.
Another trend that could act as a metric for this hypothesis is the move from Navy
providing definitive ship specifications (MILSPECS) as it has done for decades, towards
the implementation of performance specifications. Therefore, during Phase 0
(COEA/AoA studies phase) potential shipyards and systems integrators would participate
at Navy collocated design sites. We know that a key tenet for the LPD-1 7 program was a
focus on reduced MILSPECS whenever possible.
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Hypothesis 5: On-site teaming of NAVSEA personnel with shipbuilders should
become the "norm."
The presence of on-site teams had several advantages during both the Icebreaker
and LPD-17 programs. First, open discussions allowed quick solutions to simple
problems of interpretation. Second, both the government and contractor had
opportunities to influence the design process early on and head off problems that could
cause delays later. Third, it promoted good working relationships and reduced the
adversarial process that often occurs. However, to have a lot of competition, it often
takes longer to thoroughly review and compare each team's proposal. This was seen in
the LPD-17 program. It also requires a relatively large pool of highly technical in-house
personnel both for distribution to individual teams as well as in the program office to
maintain consistency between the teams.
It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of this hypothesis other than by word of
mouth. It is the general feeling for both programs that the use of the teaming concept was
a great asset to the design process and should be continued. One metric for this
hypothesis could be the turn-around time in getting answers to shipyards' questions or in
adjudicating changes. According to Fireman (Reference 6), a common theme among
previous acquisition programs is the inordinately long process of Q&A as well as change-
orders. This was a key factor in determining that an on-site Government team was a
necessity. Traditionally, the full service contractor (FSC) would formally draft and
forward questions about the ship specifications to the Program Office. Typically, after 45
days or so the Program Office would respond in a letter. More time would elapse as the
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contractor would request additional clarification via successive cycles of letter writing.
This process might consist of hundreds of letters in the first two years of a major
shipbuilding program.
For LPD- 17, no Navy program office letters were generated over the first 8
months. Day-to-day and face-to-face interactions have completely eliminated previous
cycle time delays. Decisions are made and solutions obtained within days instead of the
historic months that often slowed traditional programs.
Hypothesis 6: Despite best efforts, there is always the possibility that external forces
and factors will alter the planned acquisition process.
The above discussions shed light on certain trends taking place across several
Navy acquisition programs, as well as lessons learned and what steps still need to be
taken. However, despite best efforts by all interested parties the success of the
acquisition is often times at the mercy of forces outside of these parties' control. These
forces include the nature of the political arena where budgets are allocated and schedules
are planned, the economic health of different regions of the country where several yards
exist, the timing of the entire process, as well as the funding (or lack thereof.)
The Icebreaker program, although a success the second time around in terms of
awarding a contract within the allocated budget, was also pressured to cut the design
process short to alleviate stress on the fleet, to make use of a "pre-acquisition reform"
window, and because of an ever-present fear of losing funding. Furthermore, one of the
big change orders for this program was a mission change that had nothing to do with the
time or quality of the design effort. The bottom mapping sonar dome represented about
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25% of the total changes. This design change was a political decision driven by NSF
scientists.
Hypothesis 7: A "shorter" design phase does not guarantee a "better" product.
This hypothesis relates to the fact that efforts in the past have sometimes been
made to reduce the length of the design phase in order to shorten the overall acquisition
process. Tibbits and Keane make the general statement that while this may have led to
an earlier award of contract for some programs, it failed to achieve its basic objective. In
other words, problems that should have been resolved during the design phase were not
discovered until construction, resulting in costly, and timely, design changes. Huthwaite
relays this message in his second truth on concurrent engineering (see Figure 7.15),
The power of design needs to be leveraged earlier, broader, and deeper.
Similar to the first truth, two metrics of this truth are the change-order costs and
construction schedule overruns. Taking the necessary time during the design phase, with
an eye toward problem prevention, can potentially result in reduced change-orders,
rework, and total cycle time.
Timing of phases for each program is listed in Table 7.3. In addition, a "generic
ship" acquisition program is included for comparison taken from the article, "Improving
the Ship Design, Acquisition, and Construction Process" (Reference 6). Again, it is
important to remember that the Sealift is a non-combatant. Thus, its design schedule is
expected to be quite shorter than combatant vessel design schedules. The preliminary
design phase should last 9-16 months according to this source. The LPD-1 7 preliminary
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Again, in the contract design phase, the LPD-17 lands outside the boundary by 9 months.
Overall, in comparing the total months for DDG-51 versus the total time for LPD- 17, we
see the DDG-51 design phase takes two years less (24 months) than the LPD-17 program.
Does this mean that moving toward a greater industry focus will increase the design
time? Or perhaps, since the LPD-17 implemented so many new innovations in
concurrent engineering, acquisition reform, and IPD teaming, some additional time was
necessary to shift paradigms. Only time will tell whether this process can then take
advantage of its implementation tools to reduce total cycle time and TOC, despite the
increase in design time.
Table 7.3: Timing of Design Phases (months)
DDG-51 Icebreaker Sealift 1 LPD-17 jGeneric Ship
Concept 26 29 12 26 3-18
Prelim. Design 10 5 3 23 6-11
Contract Design 14 11 9 25 9-16
Total 50 45 24 74 18-45
Hypothesis 8: The focus of Navy responsibility should be on early design stages.
Industry responsibility should focus on the construction stage. Intermediary stages
should be a joint effort in responsibility.
During the naval buildup of the 1980s, the Navy's shipbuilding program and
shipbuilding industrial base was enormous. Now, in the 1990s and leading into the 21"
century, these resources have been greatly reduced; this trend is likely to continue. One
solution to the question of how to adapt would be to change the role and focus of both
Navy and industry as shown in Figure 7.16. The Navy, with its limited design resources,
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concept studies, leading up to MS 0 approval and issuance of the MNS, as well as
feasibility studies (ie-COEA/AoA) leading up to MS I approval and the formal
establishment of a program. Hereafter, the Navy's role on industry IPTs would vary.
The major challenge facing this new Navy role is in insuring that the level of
concept definition is sufficient to support the COEA/AoA process and to develop the
ORD and performance specifications.
After MS I, industry's new role will be to carry out functions previously
performed by the Navy. First, a design needs to be developed based on the ORD and
performance specifications (P-spec.) Trade-off analyses with regard to risk, cost,
performance, and schedule would be performed. Issues regarding survivability,
signatures, manning, and ILS must be performed. This approach with regard to Navy
IPT members would incorporate the skills possessed by Navy employees regarding
specialized knowledge and lessons learned, relationships with other government
organizations, and risk management. The first attempt toward this proposed strategy is
being implemented in the LPD- 17 program. The success of this method is yet to be seen.
Further efforts are currently being pursued for the DD-21 program.
Hypothesis 9: Full and open competition of the 1980s should be replaced with early
down-selection to one or two Navy-Industry teams.
Under the above-mentioned proposal, the Navy would be responsible for early
ship concept studies leading to a MS 0 approval (typified by the MINS.) Navy would also
be responsible for feasibility studies leading to MS I approval to formally establish a
program. Thereafter, the Navy has two options on involving industry.
1) down select to a single shipbuilder/systems integrator team
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2) award design competition contracts to a small number of teams (given the
mergers in the shipbuilding industry, two teams may be appropriate)
Option 1 maximizes the benefits of cooperation and is recommended by Tibbits
and Keane. The implementation of option I would ideally result in a continuous design
development, acquisition, and construction process without any major interruptions. The
risk is that, once a contract is awarded, there is no further competition to drive down
costs.
In contrast, the benefits of competition are realized in option 2. Certainly, the
feasibility of supporting two Industry-Navy IPTs during a competition is a disadvantage
to option 2. When looking at the total life-cycle costs of the product, Tibbitts' and
Keane's statement that option 2 requires additional funds is questionable; if looking only
at design costs, it is probably the case. They further point out that "deferring the final
down-selection until MS II has obvious political advantages and appears to be the
approach favored by senior officials."
Based on current trends toward consolidation and mergers in today's economy
there will probable only be two, at the most three, bidders. Based on trends in the
defense industry, these bidders will most likely take the form of teams consisting of at
least one shipyard as well as systems integrators (typically, combat/weapons systems
manufacturers.) As a result of government downsizing, there will be limits on the
number of qualified NAVSEA personnel available to multiple teams. The approach
taken in the Icebreaker program, and currently in DD-21 program, involved two teams
with NAVSEA personnel assigned. This approach would retain the competitive nature of
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the process. However, steps must be taken to avoid overtaxing the NAVSEA personnel
base.
This approach to teaming between shipyards results in the consolidation of
individual yard's specialties. For instance, perhaps yard A, although competent in
detailed design and construction, feels its competitive advantage lies in its innovative
thinking at the during the design stage. On the other hand, yard B may feel its designs
are not as innovative, but it has made significant capital investments in converting its
operations to being highly automated and efficient. Thus, the teaming of these two yards
results in a competitive advantage for both of them and a better bid for the Navy.
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8 CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, the examination of design spending through MS II on four distinct
naval acquisition programs has proved to be quite insightful. The evolutionary nature of
acquisition reform is conceptualized as the reader steps through each of the four ship
programs: DDG-51, USCGC Icebreaker, Strategic Sealift, and LPD-17. Acquisition
reform is truly a "work in progress." Many lessons have been learned; many issues
remain unanswered, and certainly Navy acquisition continues to evolve.
The first conclusion drawn from the undertaking of this thesis is that, despite
changes to the acquisition process, the procedure of acquiring a new combatant,
especially a multi-ship program like the DDG-51 and LPD-17, will always require an
enormous amount of effort. Regardless of whether in-house personnel are performing the
design, acting as reviewers, or a hybrid of the two, the need exists for a pool of qualified
government personnel to sustain the program. Finally, the transition in industry
involvement from design agents to shipyard (and design agents) has been seen over time
and will continue through the current DD-21 program and beyond. This transition has
not greatly changed industry design costs for these programs.
Secondly, design costs through MS II are relatively insignificant compared to
total program costs, yet 70% to 80% of the design is "fixed" by this point. Thus,
sufficient effort (in terms of money and mandays) should be taken during the design
phase. This can result in reduced change-order costs as well as a reduction in total cycle
time and TOC, despite a possible rise in design time.
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In addition, there has been a trend toward concurrent engineering and
implementation of the IPD philosophy, particularly in the LPD-17. Ultimate success in
this program remains to be seen. However, this methodology was quite successful in the
USCGC Icebreaker program.
There has been an evident move toward greater industry involvement, particularly
shipbuilders, during early stages. In the non-combatant Sealift program, this resulted in
significant cycle time reductions as well as a better understanding of challenges involved
in its implementation. In comparing the DDG-51 program with the LPD-17 program, we
see that although total effort by industry is approximately equal, the role that design
agents play versus the role that shipyards play has dramatically shifted toward the later.
This trend is expected to continue through the DD-21 program and beyond.
The debate remains on competition versus sole-sourcing. The reduced source of
qualified in-house personnel as well as the possible increase in time required for review
may work against those in support of competition. However, the Navy has less leverage
with sole-sourcing, and the inherent advantages to competitive bidding of ideas is lost.
The trend in industry today is toward consolidation of shipbuilding efforts to maximize
competitive advantage in addition to bringing in outside expertise in order to market
themselves as a "Full Service Contractor" (FSC). Having, say, two FSC teams, along
with NAVSEA personnel, future operators, and others as team members, will provide for
a competitive bidding process. Therefore, the Strategic Sealift program, which had 9
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APPENDIX: MAN-YEAR INFLATION TABLE
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Manyear Inflation Table
Year Adjustment rate [$K/manyear
FY 98 100 155.83
FY 97 98.17 152.98
FY 96 96.26 150.00
FY 95 94.12 146.67
FY 94 91.79 143.03
FY 93 89.65 139.70
FY 92 87.34 136.10
FY 91 85.00 132.45
FY 90 81.76 127.40
FY 89 78.36 122.11
FY 88 75.19 117.17
FY 87 72.54 113.04
FY 86 70.39 109.69
FY 85 68.59 106.88
FY 84 66.31 103.33
FY 83 63.89 99.56
FY 82 61.29 95.51
FY 81 57.66 89.85
FY 80 52.70 82.12
FY 79 48.24 75.17
FY 78 44.43 69.23
FY 77 41.42 64.54
FY 76 38.91 60.63
FY 75 36.75 57.27
FY 74 33.61 52.37
FY 73 30.83 48.04
WEFA GDP Inflation Table used to estimate manyear rates (assuming
$150K in FY96.)
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